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ABSTRACT 
Proportionality has been testing the judiciary for decades. However, a single replicable model 
of proportionality has not been consistently applied by the courts. This article explores the 
differential application of proportionality in English law. It is argued that these differential 
approaches create doctrinal confusion and give rise to numerous shortcomings. These 
shortcomings include 1) the a priori weighting of fundamental rights, 2) undue deference to 
State institutions and 3) variable judicial scrutiny dependent upon the source of the rights in 
question. It will be argued here that the courts ought to adopt a common standard of 
proportionality review in all proceedings concerning fundamental rights. The viability of this 
approach will then be tested against existing case law.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The domestic judiciary first gave guidance on the structure of proportionality in De Freitas.1 
The Privy Council in De Freitas, drawing upon judgments from elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth, found that proportionality required a three-limbed analysis of the 
infringement in question. This test has since been reconsidered by the House of Lords on 
numerous occasions eventually leading to the development of a four-limb proportionality test 
where the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’) is pleaded.2 Therefore, in assessing whether 
a measure infringing fundamental rights is proportionate the court must ask whether: 
1. the legislative objective was sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental 
right; 
2. the measures designed to meet the legislative objective were rationally connected to it; 
3. the means used to impair the right or freedom were no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective; and 
4. the measure strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests 
of the community.3 
It might therefore be thought that the proportionality analysis to be conducted by the courts 
is straightforward, particularly in those cases where fundamental rights are pleaded. However, 
a line of recent judgments from the Supreme Court demonstrates that the application of 
proportionality and proportionality’s precise contours are as muddied as ever, with numerous 
conceptions of proportionality being applied contemporaneously. 
                                                        
1 De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 
AC 69.  
2 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103; R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA 
Civ 840, [2003] INLR 543; Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, 
[2007] 2 AC 167. 
3 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700 at [20]. 
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This article considers each of these conceptions and highlights the shortcomings of disparate 
approaches to proportionality specifically in those cases where fundamental rights are at issue. 
The article proceeds in the following order. Section 2 analyses the emergence of 
proportionality in English law and its subsequent development. Sections 3-5 discuss the 
disparate conceptions of proportionality which have arisen in English law. Section 6 then looks 
to explain the emergence of these models but questions their continued probity. The failings 
of these differential approaches are outlined in section 7 alongside the problems which have 
arisen as a result of doctrinal confusion within the courts. The merits of a single replicable 
model of proportionality will then be demonstrated in section 8 where ‘full proportionality 
analysis’ is applied to Manchester City Council v Pinnock,4 Akerman-Livingstone v Aster 
Communities Ltd5 and R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board.6 The argument here is that full 
proportionality analysis provides an improved approach to litigation concerning fundamental 
rights. What full proportionality analysis offers over the current approach of the court is an 
‘argumentative structure’7 which takes account of the disparate interests in play where 
fundamental rights are pleaded whilst giving appropriate weight to such rights and the context 
of the case.  
2. PROPORTIONALITY, A TREE WITH MANY BRANCHES? 
Proportionality ‘has taken on a distinctly protean nature.’8 Within this protean principle 
Bjorge and Williams have identified up to six competing approaches to proportionality:9 
1. ‘normal’ two-stage EU proportionality;10 
                                                        
4 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
5 Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd (formerly Flourish Homes Ltd) [2015] UKSC 15, 
[2015] AC 1399. 
6 R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, [2016] AC 697. 
7 J Rivers, 'The Presumption of Proportionality' (2014) 77 MLR 409 at 409. 
8 E Bjorge and J R Williams, 'The Protean Principle of Proportionality: How Different is Proportionality 
in EU Contexts?' (2016) 75 Cambridge Law Journal 186 at 188. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle für Gertreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
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2. ‘normal’ three-stage EU proportionality;11 
3. EU manifest disproportionality;12 
4. ‘normal’ four-stage ECHR proportionality;13 
5. ECHR manifestly without reasonable foundation proportionality;14 and 
6. proportionality at common law.15 
On its face this six-fold understanding of proportionality is a fair reflection of proportionality’s 
manifestations. However, Bjorge and Williams’s six-fold model is capable of simplification, a 
virtue yearned for in this area of doctrinal confusion.16 It is submitted here that whilst it is 
possible to point to examples of Bjorge and Williams’s analysis, what the six-fold approach 
does is identify the historical development of proportionality in its various arenas. There are 
broader groupings visible in contemporary proportionality jurisprudence, namely: 
1. flexible unstructured proportionality (by simply asking whether the measure is a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim);17 
2. structured proportionality where EU rights apply; and 
3. structured proportionality where HRA rights apply.18 
For instance, in the case of both two and three-stage EU proportionality it would appear that 
the EU courts are in fact always applying three-stage proportionality albeit on some occasions 
more overtly than others.19 In the third stage the court will balance the competing interests 
                                                        
11 C-453/03 R (on the application of ABNA Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2005] ECR I-10423. 
12 C-331/88 R v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health ex p Fedesa 
[1990] ECR I-4023. 
13 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700. 
14 British Gurkha Welfare Society v United Kingdom (2017) 64 EHRR 11. 
15 De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 
1 AC 69. 
16 E Bjorge and J R Williams, 'The Protean Principle of Proportionality: How Different is Proportionality 
in EU Contexts?' (2016) 75 Cambridge Law Journal 186 at 188. 
17 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
18 These approaches are discussed in detail below. 
19 P Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012) at 591-592. 
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pleaded.20 Where this structure is engaged a fourth stage (frontloaded into proportionality 
analysis) is never far away; where the court is asking if a measure is suitable and necessary 
there has already been an implicit acknowledgment that the end is a legitimate aim. 
In the case of ‘ECHR manifestly without reasonable foundation proportionality’ Bjorge and 
Williams have mistaken the phraseology of the European Court of Human Rights for a model 
of proportionality in itself. A review of the Strasbourg Court’s utilisation of the ‘manifestly 
without reasonable foundation’ test demonstrates that rather than applying a different 
proportionality test the court sees a decision manifestly without reasonable foundation as a 
trigger for proportionality analysis.21 Where a decision is made that is manifestly without 
reasonable foundation then the Strasbourg court will apply proportionality in its four stages.22 
Lastly, Bjorge and Williams refer to ‘proportionality at common law’ without reference to the 
instances in which the domestic courts have deployed proportionality in relation to the 
common law. It is unquestionable that the courts have adopted proportionality where HRA 
rights and EU rights are in play, however, proportionality as a general head of judicial review 
is a comparatively recent development in administrative law.23 In those cases where 
proportionality will be called upon within the common law then it would appear that the four-
stage structure of proportionality referred to in the opening to this article is open to the courts 
where fundamental rights are concerned.24 
De Freitas provides an example of the courts’ approach to proportionality in the context of 
fundamental rights with the Privy Council applying a three-stage proportionality assessment 
testing the importance of the legislative objective, the objective’s rational connection to the 
                                                        
20 Ibid at ch 19. 
21 Connors v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 9; Stec v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 47; Carson 
v United Kingdom (2010) 51 EHRR 13; British Gurkha Welfare Society v United Kingdom (2017) 64 
EHRR 11. 
22 British Gurkha Welfare Society v United Kingdom (2017) 64 EHRR 11. 
23 Y Nehushtan, 'The Non-Identical Twins in UK Public Law: Reasonableness and Proportionality' 
(2017) 50 Israel Law Review 69 at 85-86. 
24 Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20, [2014] 2 WLR 808 at [54]; Pham v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19, [2015] 1 WLR 1591 at [95]. 
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objective, and the necessity of the measure itself. De Freitas concerned the constitutional 
rights afforded by the constitution of Antigua and Bermuda. De Freitas therefore might strictly 
fall outside of the categories outlined by Bjorge and Williams but it may be that the case rested 
on what, in domestic law, would be termed Convention rights protected by the HRA 1998 or 
perhaps even ‘proportionality at common law’.25 Proportionality at common law being the test 
which has slowly influenced areas of law lying beyond EU or Convention bases.26 Yet, since De 
Freitas the courts have persistently reassessed the nature of proportionality and the 
circumstances in which it will be applied. 
Following such reassessments the courts’ reliance upon De Freitas three-stage proportionality 
has not held sway with judicial concerns over the lack of a balancing exercise.27 The adoption 
of a four-stage proportionality test should then be welcomed and now appears to be accepted 
following Bank Mellat v HM Treasury.28  
In Bank Mellat the proportionality of the measure turned on the question as to whether a less 
intrusive measure could have been implemented and whether the measure was proportionate 
and rationally connected to the aim sought. The case concerned measures taken by the UK 
government against Bank Mellat, an Iranian bank, as a result of international sanctions placed 
upon Iran. The source of these sanctions was the Financial Restrictions (Iran) Order SI 
2009/2725 enacted by the Treasury. In assessing the proportionality of these regulations the 
Supreme Court applied four-stage proportionality. In so doing the court found that the 
measure to be disproportionate as it unduly targeted Bank Mellat over other Iranian banks 
thereby making the measure irrational, arbitrary and unnecessary. 
                                                        
25 E Bjorge and J R Williams, 'The Protean Principle of Proportionality: How Different is Proportionality 
in EU Contexts?' (2016) 75 Cambridge Law Journal 186. 
26 See for example Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19, [2015] 1 WLR 
1591 at [105]. 
27 R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 840, [2003] INLR 543 
at [20]; Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 AC 167. 
28 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700. 
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Despite the apparent clarity with which the Supreme Court spoke of proportionality in Bank 
Mellat the contours of proportionality still appear to be, in some instances, differential.29 This 
is particularly evident in a string of recent cases from the Supreme Court which each employ 
different versions of proportionality; flexible unstructured proportionality, structured 
proportionality where EU rights apply, and structured proportionality where HRA rights 
apply. Each of these approaches is mutually exclusive and as will be discussed below makes 
the form of proportionality dependent upon the facts of the case before the court and the 
source of the rights claimed. It is accepted that the proportionality model advocated in this 
article will not always lead to markedly different outcomes to those reached by the court under 
current case law. However, the stakes in any assessment of proportionality must be borne in 
mind when reviewing the current approaches adopted by the courts. If it is accepted that the 
rights contained in the Convention and other human rights instruments which have a bearing 
on domestic law, such as the European Charter on Fundamental Freedoms, may be termed 
fundamental then the courts’ approach to these rights ought to be consistent and predictable 
in order for these rights to be as effectual as possible.30 Proportionality is after all intended to 
be a ‘structured approach to balancing fundamental rights with other rights and interests in 
the best possible way.’31 In practical terms the failings of multiple proportionality tests have 
resulted in certain interferences facing variable scrutiny. The idea of variable scrutiny is not 
novel in administrative law.32 However, in the context of fundamental rights the method by 
which courts measure interference should be consistently intensive.33 Where proportionality 
                                                        
29 See generally A Davies and J Williams, 'Proportionality in English Law' in Sofia Ranchordás and 
Boudewijn de Waard (eds), The Judge and the Proportionate Use of Discretion: a Comparative Study 
(Routledge 2016). 
30 R (N) v Lewisham LBC [2014] UKSC 62, [2014] 3 WLR 1548 at [62]; R (H) v Secretary of State for 
Health [2005] UKHL 60, [2006] 1 AC 441. 
31 J Rivers, 'Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review' (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174 at 
176. 
32 See generally Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223; O'Reilly 
v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237; M Taggart, 'Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury' (2008) New 
Zealand Law Review 423. 
33 E Brems and L Lavrysen, ''Don't Use a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut': Less Restrictive Means in the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights' (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 139 at 145-146. 
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is applied in an inconsistent fashion, fundamental rights may receive little appreciation. 
Litigants and counsel are left to ‘take an educated guess at whether a court would regard’34 a 
measure proportionate. In such a case it is an individual’s interest which most likely injured 
as the weight of the State’s reasoning weighs heavily in the court’s mind.35 
3. FLEXIBLE UNSTRUCTURED PROPORTIONALITY 
Flexible unstructured proportionality asks whether the measure is ‘a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim’.36 Those cases utilising flexible unstructured proportionality tend 
to concern sensitive political issues such as national defence or resource (re)allocation to 
which the courts have traditionally afforded deference to the enactments of Parliament or the 
decisions of ministers.37 Where deference is exercised by the courts it is clear that the courts 
consider the matter of proportionality, particularly the balancing of rights, to have been pre-
emptively secured by Parliament due to their ‘institutional competence’ over the courts.38 The 
assumption here being that Parliament has conducted an inclusive debate addressing relevant 
issues including those of human rights.39 However, while it may be notionally true that a cross 
section of representations will be raised in Parliament this does not necessarily amount to 
balanced legislation that respects fundamental rights. For instance, the courts have revisited 
settled points of law following the enactment of the HRA 199840 but equally there are instances 
where there is a prima facie assumption that the appropriate balance is innate in the relevant 
legislation.41 Beyond the inconsistency of this, if it is assumed that legislation or infringing acts 
are proportionate, then the reasons proffered for the HRA 1998’s introduction are 
                                                        
34 T Hickman, 'The Substance and Structure of Proportionality' (2008) PL 694 at 716. 
35 R (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363; T Hickman, 
'The Substance and Structure of Proportionality' (2008) PL 694 at 716. 
36 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104 at [52]. 
37 R v DPP ex p Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326 at 381. 
38 J Jowell, 'Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity?' (2003) PL 592. 
39 A Kavanagh, 'Proportionality and Parliamentary Debates: Exploring Some Forbidden Territory' 
(2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 443 at 472. 
40 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. 
41 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8, [2011] 2 AC 186. 
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undermined. In other words if statutes are already sufficiently sensitive to the applicable 
competing interests of particular proceedings then there seems little point in ‘bringing rights 
home’.42 
Flexible unstructured proportionality is visible in cases concerning the vindication of property 
rights. This has been most apparent where the right to respect for one’s home is pleaded in the 
context of art.8 of the Convention. In this area the courts have neglected the contours of 
proportionality in favour of flexibility and assumptions of proportionality.43 In such cases 
there is a dereliction of duty on the part of the court to rigorously test the proportionality of a 
given measure in the face of Convention rights. In such cases the overarching caution in the 
courts is caused by two factors; 1) reverence for private property alongside the certainty 
typically attached to such rights,44 and 2) the institutional deference owed to Parliament or the 
executive. 
This flexible unstructured approach to proportionality is synonymous with a ‘managerial’ tact 
towards balancing conflicting rights which in turn limits the force of Convention rights.45 This 
is in light of the scarce resources available to public authorities with the courts deferring to 
public authorities as to how these resources should be best used. It is of course understandable 
that English courts would be cautious about imposing a positive duty on a party who otherwise 
has an absolute legal power on a prima facie reading of statute.46 This is particularly the case 
where Parliament and the courts have constructed a complicated framework to manage the 
                                                        
42 Home Office, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (Cm 3782, 1997). 
43 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28, [2016] 3 WLR 45 at [40]-[47]; Barca v Mears [2004] 
EWHC 2170 (Ch), [2005] 2 FLR 1; Donohoe v Ingram [2006] EWHC 282 (Ch), [2006] 2 FLR 1084; 
Official Receiver for Northern Ireland v Rooney [2008] NICh 22, [2009] 2 FLR 1437. 
44 L Fox O'Mahony, 'Property Outsiders and the Hidden Politics of Doctrinalism' (2014) 67 Current 
Legal Problems 409 at 411. 
45 A Latham, 'Talking Without Speaking, Hearing Without Listening? Evictions, the Law Lords and the 
European Court of Human Rights' (2011) PL 730; O Saunders, 'Article 8 in Housing Law: No Home for 
Human Rights Values' (2016) 6 Southampton Student Law Review 72. 
46 Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 AC 465 at [92]. 
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competing interests of those involved in proceedings concerning property.47 In so doing those 
individuals looking to rely on the HRA 1998 are marginalised by the use of flexible 
unstructured proportionality.  
Manchester City Council v Pinnock48 demonstrates a general tendency of English courts to 
avoid the language of balancing in their judgments.49 Mr Pinnock was a local authority tenant 
who argued that in his circumstances it would be disproportionate for the court to make a 
possession order. This argument implied that it must be open to a court to assess the 
proportionality of a possession order. In assessing this the Supreme Court found that art.8 of 
the Convention (and ss.2-3 of the HRA 1998) allowed for courts to consider the proportionality 
of an order notwithstanding the mandatory language of statute. However, for Mr Pinnock this 
did little to assist as the court found a possession order to be proportionate. Beyond the 
affirmation that proportionality had some role to play in the proceedings there is little 
guidance in the judgment to suggest how courts might assess proportionality over simply 
asking whether the measure is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.50 In 
assessing this the court placed great weight on the authority’s ‘unencumbered property rights’ 
and its obligation to efficiently manage its housing stock.51 The failure to conceive a structured 
approach to proportionality in possession cases has continued following Pinnock.52 These 
failings demonstrate the tendency of English courts to opt for certainty and deference over 
doctrinal consistency.  
                                                        
47 As to this complicated framework see, N Madge, 'Time to Clear the Forest' The Times 
<http://www.nicmadge.co.uk/housing_law_reform.php> accessed 12 October 2015. 
48 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
49 J Rivers, 'Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review' (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174 at 
179. 
50 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
51 Ibid at para 54. See also A Goymour, 'Possession Proceedings and Human Rights - the Final Word?' 
(2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 9 at 10-11. 
52 Corby BC v Scott [2012] EWCA Civ 276, [2013] PTSR 141; Thurrock v West [2012] EWCA Civ 1435, 
[2013] HLR 5; McDonald v McDonald [2014] EWCA Civ 1049, [2015] Ch 357. See also AXA General 
Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC 868. 
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It is clear from the above that the courts are sensitive to the democratic and institutional 
credentials of the party purportedly infringing fundamental rights. However, it is not only 
cases concerning institutional deference or property rights which have attracted flexible 
unstructured proportionality. The approach is also visible in areas of policy reserved to the 
executive for example admission to the UK. In such cases despite the court appreciating a 
structured approach to proportionality the court has turned its mind to the weight to be placed 
on the values at stake.53 This exercise is carried out independent of any analysis of 
proportionality and therefore fails to sufficiently engage with proportionality. Where 
proportionality is not robustly applied either in cases concerning private property rights or 
where deference is the key concern in the court’s mind, the court is found applying a test 
startlingly similar to traditional judicial review over a penetrating proportionality analysis.54 
4. STRUCTURED PROPORTIONALITY WHERE EU RIGHTS 
APPLY 
Where the court applies flexible unstructured proportionality extra-legal considerations weigh 
upon judicial minds. However, there are instances where the courts have heard arguments 
regarding fundamental rights in other contexts where the courts have been willing to apply 
structured proportionality. In so doing, the infringing action is exposed to penetrating 
analysis. This disparity is concerning in itself due to the potential for differential results from 
different legal tests.55 This is attenuated where it is apparent that the cause for this 
differentiation is the legal source from which the rights in question flow. Here those sources 
are EU law and the HRA 1998. However, this misunderstands the nature of rights protection 
in domestic law and the jurisprudence of the courts in these supranational jurisdictions. A 
                                                        
53 R (Lord Carlile of Berriew) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60, [2015] 
AC 945 at [39]-[52]. 
54 On the distinction between traditional judicial review and proportionality see Connors v United 
Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 9; R (Lord Carlile of Berriew) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2014] UKSC 60, [2015] AC 945 at [69]. 
55 T J Gunn, 'Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis' (2005) 19 Emory International 
Law Review 465. 
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review of this approach draws out a common theme; the domestic courts are favouring the 
views of these supranational courts to varying degrees making proportionality an abstract 
coloured by the legal instruments in its penumbra.  
The Supreme Court in Bank Mellat held that four-stage proportionality will be applicable 
where fundamental rights are pleaded with no apparent concern paid to their source. The 
closest the court comes to acknowledging the source of rights is Lord Reed’s recognition that 
proportionality is applied in a rather broad brush fashion by the European Court of Human 
Rights and with variable intensity in the Court of Justice of the European Union.56 However, 
the stages of proportionality are visible in each court and moreover there are legitimate 
reasons for this difference in approach due to the varying institutional capacities of each 
court.57 Yet, in Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd58 the Supreme Court found 
that four-stage structured proportionality will be applicable where rights sourced from EU law 
are pleaded, whereas those rights flowing from the Convention may use a truncated version of 
proportionality. 
Akerman concerned a local authority seeking recovery of a property let to a tenant who 
suffered from a mental disorder which amounted to a disability for the purposes of the 
Equality Act 2010.59 The tenant was housed in temporary accommodation by the local 
authority in the exercise of its homelessness duties. Whilst occupying this temporary 
accommodation over a period of nine months the local authority offered the tenant numerous 
permanent tenancies. However, the tenant declined all of these offers on the basis that the 
locations were detrimental to his mental health. The local authority therefore sought to recover 
possession of the temporary accommodation. This was resisted by the tenant on the basis that 
                                                        
56 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700 at [68]-[69]. 
57 See sections 7 and 8 below for discussion on this. 
58 Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd (formerly Flourish Homes Ltd) [2015] UKSC 15, 
[2015] AC 1399. 
59 Equality Act 2010 ss.4 and 6; Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd (formerly Flourish 
Homes Ltd) [2015] UKSC 15, [2015] AC 1399 at [2]. 
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he had been discriminated against due to his disability and that it would be disproportionate 
to dispossess him due to s.15 of the Equality Act 2010 and art.8 of the Convention respectively. 
He argued that the protection afforded by s.15 required a higher standard than that required 
by art.8 as understood following Pinnock, namely structured four-stage proportionality.60 
The Equality Act 2010 allows for discrimination where the measure is ‘a proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim’.61 This wording is not identical to art.8 of the Convention but the 
two passages ‘have come to be interpreted in the same way’.62 The primary reason given for a 
differential approach to proportionality by the Supreme Court was the consolidating nature of 
the Equality Act 2010 which apparently seeks to bring together EU law.63 Whilst it is true that 
many of the provisions incorporated in the 2010 Act are the product of the EU there are also 
purely domestic creations which have been included.64 Therefore, considering the Equality Act 
2010 as the domestic manifestation of EU law over-simplifies matters. 
In justifying the existence of two proportionality tests, Baroness Hale noted that ‘first and most 
obvious difference’65 was that Equality Act 2010 applied to both public and private actors 
unlike art.8 which is applicable only to public authorities. Therefore, the freedom from 
discrimination created by the Equality Act 2010 exists in addition to art.8 and requires 
discriminatory measures to be tested against four-stage structured proportionality in the 
following guise: 
1. is the objective sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right? 
2. is the measure rationally connected to the objective? 
                                                        
60 Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd (formerly Flourish Homes Ltd) [2015] UKSC 15, 
[2015] AC 1399 at 1402-1403. 
61 See for example Equality Act 2010 s.13(2); Equality Act 2010 s.15(1)(b). 
62 Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd (formerly Flourish Homes Ltd) [2015] UKSC 15, 
[2015] AC 1399 at [27]. 
63 Ibid at [28]. 
64 Take for example the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
65 Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd (formerly Flourish Homes Ltd) [2015] UKSC 15, 
[2015] AC 1399 at [23]. 
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3. are the means chosen no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective? 
4. the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefit of the 
impugned measure? 
This conceputalisation of proportionality will be referred to as ‘full proportionality analysis’66 
for the remainder of this article. The reasons given by Baroness Hale for this distinction rest 
upon Parliament’s decision to enact the Equality Act 2010 to free people from 
discrimination.67 The difficulty with this view is the overlap with art.14 of the Convention 
which similarly seeks to ensure the equal application of human rights rather than a prohibition 
of discrimination generally.68 Nevertheless, in assessing measures which may offend art.14 the 
European Court of Human Rights has adopted full proportionality analysis.69 On this basis it 
would appear that there is scope in this area for domestic and Strasbourg views on 
proportionality to dovetail as each is adopting four-stage structured proportionality in keeping 
with the developments of the common law.70 This is particularly the case in light of the 
common law’s apparent preference for four-stage proportionality.71 This is evident firstly in 
the emergence of three-pronged proportionality in De Freitas and the resultant recognition of 
the fourth stage – balancing.72 Article 14 does not appear to have been argued by counsel in 
Akerman and so there is no commentary by the Justices on art.14’s potential effects alongside 
the Equality Act 2010. However, it would seem paradoxical to suggest that domestic legislation 
which has in effect adopted a standard from the European Court of Human Rights ought to be 
                                                        
66 C Chan, 'Proportionality and Invariable Baseline Intensity of Review' (2013) 33 Legal Studies 1 at 8-
11, although it is appreciated that Chan uses this term in a different context. 
67 See generally Equality Act 2010 ss.5-12. 
68 See also the increased equality provisions of Protocol 12 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which the UK is yet to ratify. 
69 Belgian Linguistic Case (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252; DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 EHRR 3; Bah v 
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70 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700 at [72]. 
71 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 AC 167; A v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 at [30]-[44]; R (Daly) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532. 
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more potent than the same test as applied to Convention rights contained in sch.1 of the HRA 
1998.  
The approach in Akerman is all the more concerning in that it allows for public and private 
actors to be held to a higher standard (under the Equality Act 2010) than solely public actors 
(when considering the protection of HRA 1998 rights). There is no comment made here as to 
the appropriateness of full proportionality analysis in horizontal proceedings nor is the 
argument made here that full proportionality analysis ought to be adopted in instances not 
concerning the State. Although it is recognised by the author that there are relationships 
outside those involving the State which may be hugely distressing to individuals.73 It should 
be remembered that the aims of the Equality Act 2010 are not reflected in the Convention or 
the HRA 1998 as such. The closest the Convention comes to prohibiting discrimination is 
art.14. The Convention framework is edging towards a general prohibition of discrimination 
in Protocol 12 which relates to ‘the enjoyment of any right set forth by law’ yet Protocol 12 has 
not been ratified by the UK or added to sch.1 of the HRA 1998 and so has no standing in 
domestic law. It is possible, if politically unlikely, that the UK will ratify Protocol 12 and add 
the provision to sch.1 of the HRA 1998 thereby making Protocol 12 justiciable in domestic 
courts. If this were to occur courts, under the current practice, would apply structured 
proportionality to contraventions of the Equality Act 2010 whereas an individual pleading 
Protocol 12 would be, following Akerman, left with flexible unstructured proportionality. This 
clearly demonstrates the unsafe doctrinal foundations of the approach in Akerman.  
The reason for this change of approach from flexible unstructured proportionality to Akerman 
appears to be linked to the interests in play in these proceedings. For instance in Pinnock the 
court was concerned with mandatory legislation, statutory interpretation, and hard edged 
                                                        
73 ‘[T]here are other relationships, not only relationships between the individual and government, which 
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governments.’ Peter Archer MP, HC Deb 2 April 1971, vol 814, cols 1861-1862. 
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proprietary rights whereas in Akerman the court are utilising a test purportedly built-in to the 
applicable legislation to quell historic injustices thereby giving the court more latitude in its 
findings.74 Moreover, the courts have been comfortable finding a breach of Convention rights 
where that breach has involved art.14 and notwithstanding the requirements of statute75 or 
the flexibility afforded to ministers.76 It is true that ‘in law context is everything’.77 However, 
this context should determine the outcome of the test rather than form of the test itself. The 
disparate approaches demonstrate a reticence in the courts to engaging with substantive 
questions of adjudication. Of course the problems which flow from a recalibration of interests 
raise difficult jurisprudential questions regarding the reallocation or stymying of rights 
otherwise thought to be preferential but this is not a reason to revert to unpredictable legal 
tests.  
5. STRUCTURED PROPORTIONALITY FOR HRA 1998 RIGHTS 
The variability of proportionality tests is disappointing primarily due to the doctrinal 
confusion created by this approach particularly for those litigants who appear before the court 
who must guess the necessary legal hurdles they must clear to prove the (dis)proportionality 
of a given course of action. The differential approaches of the Supreme Court may easily lead 
one to the view that the court is applying these tests ‘depending on the facts, or on the judge’s 
own view of the merits’ of a given case.78 In such cases the differential tests which have 
emerged equally depend upon a particular bench’s opinion on the deference, due weight to be 
accorded to a party’s decision, or the legislation in question. In this exercise, the opinions of 
the Supreme Court Justices regarding the role of the relatively new court in the UK’s 
constitutional framework will no doubt influence judgments.79 For instance, Lord Kerr’s views 
                                                        
74 A Baker, 'Proportional, Not Strict, Scrutiny: Against a US Suspect Classificiations Model under Article 
14 ECHR in the UK' (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 847. 
75 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557. 
76 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68. 
77 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532 at [28]. 
78 S Lee and J Lee, 'Humility in the Supreme Court' (2015) 26 King's Law Journal 165 at 174. 
79 Ibid at 174. 
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of the Supreme Court’s ambit are clearly different to those of Lord Sumption with the former 
advocating a robust application of proportionality over the latter who favours a nuanced 
approach taking account of the institutional nature of the decision maker.80 The concerns of 
Lord Sumption are particularly prevalent in those cases concerning national security and so it 
might be thought that the courts are more comfortable applying structured review in those 
cases which are more traditionally understood to be within the sphere of justiciability. R 
(Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board81 is such a case where structured proportionality has been 
applied in light of HRA 1998 rights. 
Lumsdon followed Akerman by three months and yet Akerman is not cited in any of the 
Supreme Court Justice opinions – this is in spite of three of the five Justices being the same in 
each case. Lumsdon concerned the ‘Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates’ which sought to 
increase standards at the criminal bar and required barristers to be assessed by judges before 
being able to take instructions in certain matters. The scheme was challenged on the basis that 
it was contrary to EU Directive 2006/12382 and the Provision of Services Regulations83 in that 
the objective pursued could be achieved by less intrusive means and there was no overriding 
reason within the public interest for the State to interfere with advocacy training in this 
instance. In other words the scheme was disproportionate. 
In assessing domestic conceptions of proportionality Lord Reed and Lord Toulson, giving 
judgment on behalf of a unanimous court, found that EU and Strasbourg approaches to 
proportionality differed.84 In matters concerning the Convention and the HRA 1998 four-stage 
structured proportionality should be applied.85 In cases which raise a point of EU law, such as 
                                                        
80 Ibid at 172-174; R (Lord Carlile of Berriew) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] 
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84 R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, [2016] AC 697 at [26]. 
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Lumsdon, the court should look to art.5(4) of the Treaty on European Union to assess the 
proportionality of a given measure.86 In light of this, the Supreme Court warned against ‘an 
excessively schematic approach [when dealing with EU law], since the [CJEU] jurisprudence 
indicates that the principle of proportionality is flexible in its application’.87  
Lumsdon has since been followed in R (British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v Secretary of 
State for Health.88 The case concerned restrictions placed upon tobacco advertising in an 
attempt to improve public health. These restrictions were challenged on a number of grounds 
including the proportionality of the measures which were enacted in line with an EU directive 
allowing for restrictions on ‘fundamental freedoms’.89  The case also concerned Convention 
rights making the precise form of proportionality to be applied difficult to discern in light of 
the differing approaches of the Supreme Court.90 In spite of the acknowledgment of a plurality 
of proportionality tests the court in British American Tobacco found that affirmations of two-
stage proportionality in EU jurisprudence would nevertheless lead to four-stage 
proportionality.91 Turning attention to the test to be applied when assessing Convention or 
HRA 1998 rights revealed much the same test in the opinion of Green J. This realisation 
further undermines the case for applying differential proportionality tests depending upon the 
source of the rights in question as indicated in Lumsdon.  
The argument in favour of a common understanding of proportionality, as a four-pronged test, 
receives support from Green J’s statement regarding proportionality: 
 It is not in dispute that such a balancing test [proportionality strictu sensu] does arise 
under the ECHR… and hence in an EU case where the Charter is at stake or where the 
                                                        
86 Article 5(4) reads: ‘Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall 
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.’ 
87 R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, [2016] AC 697 at [26]. 
88 R (British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2016] EWHC 1169 (Admin), 
[2016] ETMR 38. 
89 Ibid at [410]. 
90 Ibid at [426]. 
91 Ibid at [427]-[430]. 
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ECHR is prayed in aid as a general principle of EU law, it would be inconsistent to 
refrain from similarly applying this component of the proportionality test. To do 
otherwise would be to create the risk that a Court would apply two different tests 
when deciding whether the same fundamental right was breached, even though the 
tests under EU law and the ECHR were intended to be the same.92 (emphasis added) 
Herein is the crux of this article. To apply varying proportionality assessments gives rise to 
considerable inconsistencies and uncertainties in the law over rights which are of the same 
fundamental character albeit from different sources. Despite Green J’s assertion that the 
varying tests will achieve the same end, or in the least arrive at the same conception of 
proportionality, this is not always the case as is demonstrated in sections 7-8 below. Rather 
than assessing the interference with a particular right in a uniform discernible way the courts 
are instead finding themselves beholden to their historical institutional character together 
with the normative background to particular instruments. It might be argued that these are 
sufficient justifications for the approach adopted in Lumsdon and Bank Mellat where the court 
discerned the form of proportionality via the legislative source of the right pleaded. 
6. DEFENDING MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO 
PROPORTIONALITY 
There are a number of explanations offered for contemporaneous approaches to 
proportionality. These explanations might be broadly categorised within two schools; firstly, 
the institutional nature and functions of courts, and, secondly, the normative background 
within which courts operate in certain situations.  
                                                        
92 Ibid at [680]. 
21 
 
a) Institutional Nature and Functions 
The institutional nature of a court exercising its powers under s.143D of the Housing Act 1996, 
as was the case in Pinnock, is to allow for a summary assessment of a landlord’s procedural 
duties. If these procedures have been satisfied then a court must make a possession order.93 
The force of s.143D is given further strength by the view that in the great majority of cases it 
would be ‘burdensome and futile’ to require a local authority to argue an order is 
proportionate.94 Therefore, it will be assumed that a local authority landlord is acting in 
accordance with its duties including those of a public law nature.95 This is perhaps anchored 
in the belief that a freeholder’s ‘unencumbered property rights’96 ought to win out over any 
competing claim. This reverence for certainty in property relationships might be attributed to 
the idea that fairness is best achieved through certainty, notwithstanding the unsympathetic 
rules this creates.97 
Adopting light-touch proportionality might be aligned with deference to the legislature and 
executive in what is an area fraught with social policy. In this sense the approach of the courts 
where art.8 is pleaded in competition with property rights reveals a strong preference for an 
owner’s exclusive control of their possessions. This reveals a built-in predilection to private 
property rights in English law in keeping with the history of the common law.98 
The predilection to private property rights fails to account for the broader literature in this 
area which recognises that the underpinnings of property may be understood in a range of 
ways.99 Foremost of these understandings in Anglo-American thought is the ‘bundle of rights’ 
which an owner enjoys. These rights allow for, among other things, the right to use, the right 
                                                        
93 Housing Act 1996 ss.143D-143F. 
94 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104 at [53]. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid at [54]. 
97 J Howell, 'The Human Rights Act 1998: Land, Private Citizens, and the Common Law' (2007) 123 
LQR 618 at 633-635. 
98 Semayne's Case (1604) 5 Coke Rep 91; Entick v Carrington 95 ER 807. 
99 See generally A J MacLeod, 'Bridging the Gaps in Property Theory' (2014) 77 MLR 1009; J E Penner 
and H Smith (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford University Press 2013);  
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to exclude, and the right to transfer.100 This understanding is based upon a Hohfeldian 
conception of legal rights101 which have in turn been transposed into property discourse.102 
Understood in this way property rights have correlative ‘no-rights’ therefore whilst an owner 
will have a right to use his own land others have the correlative no-right. However, to 
understand these property rights as absolute and unchallengeable overlooks the various 
instances in which property interests may be stymied.103 A recognition of these instances 
brings to light that ‘property is intelligible only as a social construct, as a perfect malleable 
category wholly at the service of collective goals.’104 This puts property rights on the same plane 
as other legal rights including human rights which themselves may yield to collective goals and 
places property firmly within the gaze of structured proportionality. So to think of property as 
monolithic and worthy of a weaker form of review in flexible unstructured proportionality 
analysis misunderstands the nuances of property theory to the detriment of individuals with 
conflicting fundamental rights. It is law which gives rise to property rights105 and therefore law 
may stay property interests in much the same way as other important rights are limited; where 
it is proportionate to do so. To do otherwise ties the courts to historical notions of property 
which do not account for the multi-layered nature of property in a modern legal context.106  
Another explanation provided in defence of multiple approaches to proportionality is the 
institutional history of the courts. Any judicial review of administrative action, whether based 
                                                        
100 J E Penner, 'The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property' (1996) 43 UCLA Law Review 711 at 712-730. 
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upon the infringement of fundamental rights or legality, is based in the common law. In such 
cases the job of the court is to ensure the executive acts within the law and does not go further 
than allowed for by Parliament.107 This historic view is reminiscent of the initial views of the 
House of Lords where art.8 came into conflict with private property.108 However, where 
common law rights are pleaded the courts have, apart from the HRA 1998, sought to introduce 
increased scrutiny approaching proportionality and arguably more intense than flexible 
unstructured proportionality.109 The incorporation of proportionality continues in the area of 
legitimate expectations thereby further undermining a court’s institutional nature and 
functions serving as a justification for disparate approaches to proportionality.110 
b) Normative Background 
In addition to the institutional justifications for disparate approaches to proportionality there 
are also differing normative backgrounds for the rights in question. For instance, the basis and 
force of rights sourced from EU law differ from those in the HRA 1998. Whilst EU law, in the 
form of treaties and regulations, is directly applicable in English law, the HRA 1998 rights are 
given effect by the 1998 Act itself.111 In interpreting the nature of HRA 1998 rights the judiciary 
must of course consider the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights,112 however, 
they are not bound by those judgments in the same way they are CJEU judgments.113  
Therefore, whilst proportionality may be a common label there are perhaps legitimate reasons 
for cultivating differential proportionality tests. 
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For domestic courts the public/private divide appears to allow for varying conceptions of 
proportionality, particularly in those cases concerning flexible unstructured proportionality.114 
In keeping with the institutional trappings of the domestic courts discussed above, the core of 
private law is often seen to be the vindication of property rights.115 Within this conception of 
private is the idea that the State in such instances ‘… could be regarded as a neutral authority 
to balance conflicting interests of two parties to find solutions for conflicts that are regarded 
as purely private.’116 This is a drastically different view to that of the courts where fundamental 
rights, a manifestation of public law, are in play. In such cases the relationship at issue is the 
relationship between the State and an individual, rather than between individuals.117 This 
divide is then maintained in the HRA 1998.118 Alongside this is the influence of s.3 of the HRA 
1998 which requires courts, so far as is possible to do so, to interpret legislation in a 
Convention-compliant manner. This is starkly different to the duty imposed upon the courts 
by s.2 of the European Communities Act 1972 which requires domestic courts to recognise the 
supremacy of EU law irrespective of its incompatibility with UK legislation.119 Therefore in 
such a case the tests which are applied to alleged infringements with rights from an EU source 
might be expected to face a more robust scrutiny than Convention rights as incorporated by 
the HRA 1998. However, this is not the track that has been followed by the courts as discussed 
above in relation to Bank Mellat, Lumsdon, and Akerman.  
It is certainly true that it is open to the courts and Parliament to provide for greater protection 
of rights than is required by the European Court of Human Rights.120 For example, the test in 
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s.15 of the Equality Act 2010 makes it unlawful for a person to discriminate against another 
where it cannot be shown ‘that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim’. Disability discrimination may be of such historical significance that any 
instance of it should face intense scrutiny. On its face this is a reasonable assertion and is an 
approach similar to that recognised by US courts who define gender and race discrimination 
as ‘suspect classifications’ and therefore ought to be subject to ‘strict scrutiny’.121 The difficulty 
with such an approach in the UK is that there is no basis for this distinction within the context 
of the Equality Act 2010. The Government’s Explanatory Notes to s.15 state that the intention 
of the provision was to allow for the ‘appropriate balance’ between those facing discrimination 
and those that may have a legitimate aim resulting in discrimination.122 The same ‘appropriate 
balance’ is said to run through the package of rights in the HRA 1998 the overall goal of which 
is proportionality.123 Therefore, the argument that Parliament requires greater scrutiny of 
discrimination than of interferences with other fundamental rights does not hold weight. 
The same comments made above are applicable to those instances where the common law 
protects fundamental rights, either those contained in the Convention or those which predate 
the HRA 1998.124 This is particularly timely given the renaissance in common law 
constitutionalism.125 Where the courts have considered common law fundamental rights they 
have engaged with proportionality in all but name.126  
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The courts are clearly comfortable in applying the structure of full proportionality analysis 
where common law fundamental rights are concerned independent of the Convention and the 
HRA 1998.127 Therefore, whilst there are a range of options regarding the scrutiny to apply to 
interferences with common law fundamental rights it seems rightly doubtful that the court 
would adopt any standard less than structured proportionality. The courts’ blanket application 
of structured proportionality to common law fundamental rights makes the argument that 
there ought to be varying degrees of scrutiny for other fundamental rights difficult to maintain. 
This is not to say that the trajectory of common law fundamental rights is settled. Bowen cites 
R (Keyu) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs128 as an example of the 
uncertain structure of proportionality in the courts.129 However, the Supreme Court’s rejection 
of proportionality in Keyu is very specific to the facts. The question before the court was not 
whether structured proportionality should be applied to potential infringements of 
fundamental rights rather the question was whether proportionality ought to replace 
Wednesbury rationality review in relation to administrative acts.130 This is a very different 
proposition to the concern of this work which is the use of full proportionality analysis where 
fundamental rights may have been interfered with.131 
Whilst the normative backgrounds of each framework (EU, Convention, and common law) 
might give some cursory reason for the emergence of differing proportionality tests they do 
not provide a contemporaneous justification for the differential tests themselves. In such 
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circumstances there is the ever present danger of doctrinal confusion ‘… which is a recipe for 
inconsistency.’132  
7. IN FAVOUR OF UNIFORM AND REPLICABLE 
PROPORTIONALITY 
The aims of proportionality were explored by Lord Reed in his dissenting opinion in Bank 
Mellat.133 In this judgment Lord Reed unknowingly makes the argument for ‘full 
proportionality analysis’ as outlined above in section 4. In his judgment there are implicit 
suggestions which support this. The first is the acceptance that proportionality arises from a 
pursuit of ‘fair balance’ between the interests of the individual and the community at large.134 
This idea cuts to the core of the common law’s search for a ‘just distribution of power’.135 Full 
proportionality analysis complements domestic jurisprudence advocating ‘structured and 
stringent’136 review of measures infringing rights.137 It is this structure of proportionality which 
forces judges to work through their findings in a transparent fashion.138 These attributes are 
visible in Bank Mellat with the precise points of disagreement between the majority and 
minority of the Supreme Court clearly articulated.139 
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 The second implicit recognition in Lord Reed’s judgment is the ‘broad-brush’ approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights.140 It should be recalled that the European Court is not a 
court of precedent, it is not bound to follow its previous decisions and so does not approach 
matters in the same principled fashion a common law court might.141 Moreover, the European 
Court must concern itself with the margin of appreciation which seeks to afford Member States 
latitude to respect the Convention albeit within the context of their cultural and historical 
traditions.142 This is not to say that the domestic courts may not go further as they have done 
in developing structured proportionality.143 This is especially the case in the unique 
constitutional settlement of the UK in which it may be argued that it is the duty of the UK 
judiciary to develop a ‘municipal law of human rights’.144 This is precisely what ought to 
happen in the case of proportionality in the UK. For example the proportionality assessment 
used in Akerman has been utilised in domestic cases concerning human rights arguments in 
keeping with the analytical approach of the common law.145 In Akerman the Supreme Court 
found that this approach had been given a statutory footing in the Equality Act 2010, yet this 
stood apart from the proportionality assessment to be made where art.8 was in play. These 
tests are clearly not two branches of the same tree on an equal footing.  
Disparate proportionality analyses give rise to substantive theoretical issues. The first of these 
is an apparent pre-weighing of rights which is not present in the Convention or the HRA 
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1998.146 The second is the variable intensity of review based upon a right’s legislative source.147 
Thirdly, flexible unstructured proportionality tests unduly calibrate proceedings in the State’s 
favour, essentially providing a general pre-emptive deference to State institutions. There is an 
element of reciprocal causality with these doctrines. The argument made here is not that the 
differential approaches which have been highlighted give rise to these phenomena but rather 
they entrench and propagate these doctrines. Where the courts opt for flexible unstructured 
proportionality policy preferences become more pronounced thereby making it difficult for a 
litigant to argue that a measure is disproportionate.148 Alternatively where it is unclear which 
proportionality test the courts will apply it is equally difficult to coherently argue that a 
measure is proportionate. 
Weighting of rights and intensity of review are naturally linked as one will necessarily lead to 
the other.149 The rights contained in the Convention and the HRA 1998 ought to be viewed as 
a whole indivisible ‘single package’.150 It is true that the European Court often refers to certain 
rights such as those contained in arts. 2, 3, and 7 as some of ‘the most fundamental values of 
a democratic society’.151 However, this does not amount to these rights trumping others in all 
circumstances rather this is something for the judiciary in a given case to factor into their 
analysis of proportionality at the balancing stage in light of the level of the interference with 
that right (and perhaps others).152 It is suggested here that the domestic courts ought to 
recognise that whilst some rights may in the abstract be weightier than others, where 
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precedence will fall is a product of balancing and weighting to be conducted by the bench in 
that particular case. Another issue flowing from the current confusion around the precise 
contours of proportionality is the intensity of review placed upon a measure becomes 
dependent upon the right’s legal source.  
At present where art.8 arises in possession proceedings a county court judge is expected to test 
interference with that right against a nebulous criteria which she is told she is best placed to 
determine in a given case.153 This is in contrast to full proportionality analysis as advocated in 
Lumsdon. The current differential approach to proportionality and the application of flexible 
unstructured proportionality in general unduly attenuates matters in favour of the State. For 
example in Pinnock the Supreme Court merged ‘all four stages of the [proportionality] enquiry 
into one general question of ... whether the measure [was] reasonable or permissible’.154 Under 
such a test it is incredibly difficult for a claimant to argue that the actions of the State are 
disproportionate due the heavy presumption made in the State’s favour. The proportionality 
test therefore becomes little more than traditional Wednesbury reasonableness rather than a 
penetrating analysis of whether the State has disproportionately infringed an individual’s 
rights.155 In such instances the court may feel that it is appropriate to defer to the institutional 
competence of a State body, such as a local authority and its assessment of how best to manage 
its own legal interests which often correlate with those of the community at large. This is an 
unnecessary assumption, full proportionality analysis seeks to measure the costs of any rights 
infringement for both the rights-holder and society overall.156 Moreover, making assumptions 
as to institutional superiority, whilst perhaps expedient, undermines the obligation placed 
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upon the State to demonstrate an evidential basis for its belief that it has acted 
proportionately.157 
In Akerman and Lumsdon the Supreme Court has sought to compartmentalise various 
applications of proportionality based on the source of the rights in question. However, this 
underplays and to an extent misunderstands the method by which EU rights and HRA rights 
are given effect within English law. In the case of rights based in EU law, the European 
Communities Act 1972 is not itself the ’originating source of those rights’158 rather the 1972 Act 
is a ‘conduit pipe’159 through which EU law may have direct effect. Whereas those rights 
contained in the HRA 1998, whilst influenced by the European Court of Human Rights,160 exist 
by virtue of their inclusion in sch.1 of the HRA 1998. The HRA rights’ ‘source is the statute, 
not the Convention.’161 Therefore, if a robust proportionality analysis ought to apply to either 
set of rights it should be those fundamental rights on a domestic footing. This is especially the 
case as the courts are experienced in weighing and balancing competing interests under the 
guise of reasonableness that is akin to proportionality even in those cases not concerning 
fundamental rights.162 
Finally, Lumsdon suggests where a Convention right is at issue the court ought to use full 
proportionality analysis, however, where EU legislation is in play flexibility should be favoured 
over structure. It seems that in each of instance the problem faced by the courts is not a lack 
of belief in structured proportionality as such but which party should bear the burden for 
(dis)proving the proportionality of the measure in question. The uncertainty created by the 
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judiciary to date is ‘indicative of worry and uncertainty’163 as to the angle from which 
proportionality should be approached. The same uncertainty is challenging for litigants who 
ought to be ‘cognisant of the legal consequences of their actions’.164 Reanalysing Pinnock, 
Akerman and Lumsdon with this in mind demonstrates that full proportionality analysis is 
possible in all cases concerning fundamental rights. 
In assessing proportionality the courts regularly have trouble deciding where the burden of 
(dis)proving each of these questions will rest; should there be a ‘presumption of 
proportionality’165 or should it be for the State to prove the proportionality of a measure? In 
Pinnock the Supreme Court clearly found that the presumption ought to be that the actions of 
a local authority were proportionate whereas in Akerman the Supreme Court felt that ss.15 
and 136 of the Equality Act 2010 required the infringing party to demonstrate the 
proportionality of the measure.166 This demonstrates the significance of the burden of proof 
when assessing proportionality. It is suggested here that the starting point for the court should 
be a shared burden of proof built into full proportionality analysis. Rivers’s work is instructive 
on this point: 
…[O]nce a state measure has crossed the rational threshold by being shown, by the 
State, to pursue a legitimate aim (stage 1) by means which are rationally connected to 
that aim (stage 2), the burden of proof shifts [from the defendant] to the claimant to 
demonstrate on the balance of probabilities either that an alternative measure is 
equally effective and less intrusive (stage 3), or that the measure is unbalanced in 
imposing an excessive cost to rights (stage 4).167 
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Rivers goes on highlight that there are cases where this bare allocation should be tweaked 
thereby creating a presumption of proportionality requiring the right-holder to demonstrate 
disproportionality at all four stages. Foremost of such instances for the purposes of this work 
are those in which positive law proscribes a particular outcome168 and decisions made under 
proportionate sets of rules.169 The problem with Rivers’s attenuation of the burden of proof in 
favour of the decision-maker in such cases is the fact insensitivity with which the courts would 
approach potential infringements of fundamental rights.170 Fact insensitive instruments or 
procedures are more likely to result in disproportionate interferences with fundamental 
rights.171 Therefore, any presumption of proportionality ought to be doubted to allow for a 
minimum standard of review in those cases where fundamental rights are at issue.172 Any 
presumption of proportionality by way of placing the burden of proof entirely on the shoulders 
of the right-holder is an abdication of the responsibilities placed on the judiciary by the HRA 
1998.173 This is not to say that, as suggested by Chan, the burden of proof should be placed 
solely on the State.174 Such an approach would undermine the correlative adjudicative function 
of the court.175 It is the court that is best placed to assess the proportionality of an act due to 
their inherent experience in adversarial adjudication.176 Therefore, the courts are concurrently 
the guardian of rights and the forum in which the parties will argue the proportionality of a 
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measure.177 This requires a middle ground between holding the right-holder to the burden of 
proof178 and requiring the State to demonstrate proportionality.179 Rivers’s bare placement of 
the burden of proof provides a model for the court to balance the competing interests of parties 
engaged in rights adjudication. Concurrently this provides the ‘argumentative structure’180 
which proportionality requires thereby making it clear to courts and litigants the requirements 
of full proportionality analysis.  
In earlier work Rivers discusses other considerations which may colour the intensity of review 
arising from proportionality.181 For Rivers deference or restraint may allow for the courts to 
vary the intensity of review applied when asking if a measure if proportionate. However, as 
discussed above it is deference that has resulted in several conceptions of proportionality being 
simultaneously applied by the courts. In considering the ‘relative institutional competence’182 
the court should recall its adjudicative function in addition to its institutional relationship with 
other state bodies. When asking an infringing party to argue that a measure pursues a 
legitimate aim and that the measure has a rational connection to that aim (stages 1 and 2 of 
full proportionality analysis) the court ought not to accept that the body’s ‘assessment is 
sufficiently reliable’183 unless that body has sufficiently demonstrated to the court, following 
arguments from the rights-bearer, that the measure indeed pursues a legitimate aim and has 
a rational connection. To vary the intensity of review with respect to deference would allow for 
the structure of full proportionality analysis to apply but the variability in its application would 
still be visible. If the infringing party has greater institutional expertise than the court to make 
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decisions which may infringe fundamental rights then it is difficult to imagine where 
demonstrating legitimacy and rationality would be challenging. Following this Rivers’s 
assertion that the greater the interference with a fundamental right, ‘the more evidence the 
court will require that the factual basis of the limitation has been correctly established’184 does 
not hold. This approach would alter the question asked by the courts from one of legitimate 
aim and rational connection to one of is their sufficient evidence to support the assertion that 
the measure was proportionate. Such a view would logically lead to an acceptance that some 
fundamental rights are more important than others not only in the abstract sense but also on 
the facts before the court.185 The problems flowing from an a priori hierarchy of rights have 
been highlighted above and have played a part in the disparate approaches to proportionality 
in the courts to date. For this reason, the variable intensity of review suggested by Rivers is 
rejected. However, the suggestion that parties ought to provide as detailed and weighty 
evidence as possible in arguing for (dis)proportionality is very much at the core of what is 
required of parties under full proportionality analysis. This is not a reallocation of the bare 
placement of the burden of proof rather this is an aid for litigants who wish to argue for 
(dis)proportionality. With a rejection of deference under full proportionality analysis an 
‘institutionally sensitive’186 approach is equally unwelcome due to the disparate conceptions 
of proportionality and related shortcomings identified in the earlier parts of this article.  
Having full proportionality analysis be the court’s starting point for any assessment of 
proportionality ensures that litigants’ minds are focused on the requirements of 
proportionality and precisely which limbs of the proportionality test must be satisfied. The 
benefits of this starting point are evident when considered alongside the cases discussed 
below. 
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8. FULL PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS APPLIED 
The following passages owe much to the work of Chan187 and Rivers188 in extrapolating the 
character of proportionality. The three conflicting approaches discussed above have each 
touched upon what may be called ‘rules and exceptions’,189 those are rights which may be 
derogated from in prescribed circumstances making the model of proportionality applied 
particularly important. The following discussion will apply full proportionality analysis to 
three of the cases highlighted above, Pinnock, Akerman, and Lumsdon.  
a) Manchester City Council v Pinnock 
Mr Pinnock argued that a possession order was disproportionate and therefore a breach of 
art.8. Nevertheless the court found an order to be a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim. Applying full proportionality analysis to Pinnock would have directed the 
court’s attention to the substantive interests in play which are largely ignored by flexible 
unstructured proportionality. In applying full proportionality analysis the court must first ask 
whether the local authority’s objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right. The local authority’s objective in Pinnock was recovery of property in 
pursuit of its statutory duties.190 This objective matches the qualifications in art.8(2) of the 
Convention thereby satisfying the first stage of structured proportionality. 
Second, ‘is the measure rationally connected to the objective?’ Like the first stage it is 
straightforward to argue that the means used by the local authority are rationally connected 
to their aim. It is difficult to think of other means which might be used to recover possession 
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of the property in this case.191 This clearly ‘makes some contribution to the aim’192 pursued by 
the authority. 
Third, the State must prove that the measure is ‘no more than necessary to accomplish the 
objective’.193 It is here that the courts are likely to face the most difficulty in assessing the 
proportionality of a possession order. In Pinnock the local authority’s objective was the 
recovery of possession in pursuit of the removal of Mr Pinnock’s family who had been the 
source of anti-social behaviour. On this basis it seems in the least arguable that removing Mr 
Pinnock from his home in order to remove his family and their anti-social behaviour is more 
than necessary to accomplish the council’s objective. If the local authority is unsuccessful on 
this head then the measure will be disproportionate and therefore fail.194 The question then 
becomes what other powers a local authority possesses to achieve their aim. In 2010 when 
Pinnock reached the Supreme Court Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBO) were extant, 
therefore, Mr Pinnock logically argued that the correct course for the Supreme Court would be 
ASBOs or similar orders195 excluding Mr Pinnock’s children from the area thereby eliminating 
the opportunity for further anti-social behaviour.196 The court considered this but reached the 
view that such an order would not quell the anti-social behaviour as they had failed in the 
past.197 Bearing in mind the criminal liability which flows from the breach of an ASBO or 
similar order it is difficult to follow the court’s reasoning when the problem is reassessed 
through the lens of whether the measure was ‘no more than necessary to accomplish the 
objective’ sought. If the possibility of criminal liability was not able to dissuade Mr Pinnock’s 
                                                        
191 However, there are instances where it may be arguable that the means used to recover possession of 
another’s home are not rationally connected to that objective. For instance see McDonald v McDonald 
[2014] EWCA Civ 1049, [2015] Ch 357; S Nield, 'Thumbs Down to the Horizontal Effect of Article 8' 
(2015) Conv 77 at 80-81. 
192 J Rivers, 'The Presumption of Proportionality' (2014) 77 MLR 409 at 421. 
193 Ibid at 422. 
194 Ibid at 414. 
195 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.1; Housing Act 1996 s.153C. 
196 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104 at [124]. 
197 Ibid at [125]-[130]. 
38 
 
children from anti-social behaviour why should Mr Pinnock bear responsibility for their 
actions. In such a case the measure seems to be more than necessary to achieve its aim. 
Fourth, the balancing exercise, it was accepted by the court that granting possession to the 
local authority would amount to a prima facie breach of art.8(1). However, a possession order 
would serve to protect the interests of the local community. Balancing rights requires gains to 
community interests to be ‘at least as great as the cost to rights’.198 Proving this will turn on a 
claimant’s ability to demonstrate that the measure is ‘out of line with the order of values 
expressed more widely in the law and public culture’.199 In this case it seems difficult for Mr 
Pinnock to argue that his art.8 rights ought to outweigh the art.8 rights of neighbouring 
tenants who suffered due to his family’s anti-social behaviour and so there does not seem to 
be ‘an excessive cost to rights’.200 
Applying full proportionality analysis to Pinnock has demonstrated that the courts have erred 
in seeking to maintain flexible proportionality due to the judicial confusion and uncertainty 
that has followed.201 In looking to afford deference to local authorities the courts have 
undermined ‘the clear and rational structure of the proportionality test itself’.202 Full 
proportionality analysis allows for the courts to insightfully test the acts of public authorities 
against the requirements of fundamental rights with a view to minimise the extent to which 
human rights are infringed. In Pinnock the Supreme Court displayed a remarkable deference 
to the local authority.203 Full proportionality analysis shifts focus from the institutional nature 
of the decision making body and places the burden upon the rights-holder and the public 
authority to demonstrate that a measure is (dis)proportionate.  
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b) Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd 
The Equality Act 2010 states that where there has been unfavourable treatment of someone 
due to a prescribed characteristic it will be discriminatory unless treatment is ‘a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim’.204 In such instances it will be for the ‘alleged 
discriminator’ to prove that there were no discriminatory acts.205 On this formulation it 
appears that Parliament has streamlined the proportionality analysis. However, if one looks 
more closely there is no reason why this could not be applied in much the same way as full 
proportionality analysis with four stages and the bare allocation of burdens identified above. 
The very existence of s.15 focuses the court’s mind on the question of whether an objective is 
sufficiently important to justify discriminatory behaviour. The words ‘legitimate aim’ in s.15 
require the court to consider whether the behaviour is rationally connected to the purported 
objective. Whilst the proportionality of the means used requires the act to be no more than 
necessary to achieve the objective in light of the discrimination suffered. Therefore, the only 
streamlining in s.15 is one of syntax rather than substance.  
Taking the above view as to the application of proportionality casts the facts of the case in a 
new light which is thoughtfully explored by Lord Wilson. For Lord Wilson, ‘[t]he structured 
approach requires attention to be given, first, to the claimant's aims or objectives in taking the 
steps for the purpose of securing the defendant's eviction’.206 Whilst Lord Wilson expresses 
the first step of proportionality differently to that outlined above it is substantively the same 
enquiry; with the outcome remaining the acceptance of the local authority’s argument that the 
eviction was sought in pursuit of its own legal obligations to provide the flat to a new owner 
with vacant possession.207 Therefore, not only did the local authority no longer wish to house 
homeless tenants in that particular building but the local authority no longer had the legal 
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authority to award tenancies or allow tenancies to continue.208 Submissions to this effect were 
made by the authority throughout the proceedings thereby fulfilling the burden of proof placed 
upon it by full proportionality analysis. Therefore, the authority has successfully demonstrated 
that their objective is sufficiently important to justify dispossessing the tenant. 
In applying the second, third, and fourth step of a structured proportionality analysis Lord 
Wilson conflates the issues albeit in reaching a sensible conclusion. Lord Wilson’s approach 
on these issues is perhaps understandable given their straightforward application. The 
objective of the local authority was vacant possession of the flat to enable the freeholder to 
exercise his absolute right to possession. Related to this the local authority had sought to fulfil 
its statutory obligation to house the tenant in the same street which had been unsuccessful due 
to the tenant’s refusal to take up the tenancy in light of his severe disability pending therapy. 
Clearly, the authority’s actions are rationally connected to their objective – vacant possession. 
Further, it is difficult to conceive a less intrusive measure which would achieve the authority’s 
objective given uncertainty around when the tenant may be well enough to take on a new 
tenancy.209 Therefore, the second and third heads of full proportionality analysis are fulfilled. 
On the final head of proportionality the question is whether the impact of the measure is 
disproportionate to the resultant benefits. It is here that the unique situation in the case is 
particularly acute. In circumstances where the local authority intended to house another 
homeless tenant in the flat then it would be difficult to think that the benefits of eviction would 
outweigh the difficulties faced by the tenant in finding alternative accommodation. However, 
the delay in providing the third-party freeholder of the building with vacant possession had 
led to the local authority being potentially liable to the freeholder for damages flowing from 
their inability to sell. In light of this and the uncertainty as to when the tenant may be able to 
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move from the flat it seems proportionate (and therefore not discriminatory) to evict the 
tenant despite the significant anguish this might cause. 
The judgment in Akerman demonstrates two matters. First, the application of full 
proportionality analysis does not serve to irrevocably recalibrate proceedings in favour of the 
party arguing a contravention of their rights such as that which appears to have unsettled the 
Supreme Court in Pinnock. Second, full proportionality analysis does not have to be limited to 
instances in which a person’s Convention rights or EU law is at issue, rather, where any 
fundamental right is threatened proportionality is able to serve as a general head of review 
and therefore courts ought to be confident in their application of proportionality.  
c) R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board 
Lord Reed and Lord Toulson’s assessment of proportionality in Lumsdon contended that four-
stage proportionality is not applicable in instances concerning EU law. This assertion flows 
from the risk in trying to identify ‘general principles [of EU law]’210 thereby underplaying the 
nuances present in the CJEU’s jurisprudence, which according to their Lordships 
conceptualises proportionality as a two stage test concerning the suitability of a measure and 
its necessity.211 However, an examination of the CJEU’s case law and the application of this 
test in Lumsdon demonstrate that courts are only nominally applying simplified 
proportionality whilst four stage proportionality is never far away.212 
The two stages accepted by the Supreme Court in Lumsdon conflate the first three stages of 
full proportionality analysis. Thereafter, the court identifies a line of jurisprudence in the 
CJEU in which the balance of a measure will be assessed and the burden will be weighed 
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against the purported advantages.213 The final point made in relation to the structure of 
proportionality in matters of EU law is the varying intensity applied by the CJEU.214 This is 
remarkably similar to the balancing task advocated by the fourth limb of full proportionality 
analysis which requires a balance of the advantages of the measure versus the disadvantages. 
This assessment will of course be coloured by the ‘values expressed more widely in the law and 
public culture’.215 The question therefore becomes why the Supreme Court in Lumsdon felt it 
necessary to distinguish between proportionality in Convention (and HRA 1998) cases and EU 
cases. 
For Lord Reed the distinction was a result of the varying approaches of the CJEU and 
proportionality’s application in particular instances. In the case of national measures 
derogating from ‘fundamental freedoms’, now consolidated in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights,216 the court should, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, apply the following four stage 
test: 
1. the derogation must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
2. the aims of the measure must be sought in the general interest; 
3. the measure must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective; and 
4. the measure must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.217 
Stages 3 and 4 of this test ‘correspond to the two limbs of the [CJEU] proportionality 
principle’.218 In all of the EU jurisprudence referred to in Lumsdon it appears that it is the 
institutional or legislative source of a measure which determines the scrutiny to be applied by 
the court. The shortcomings of varying levels of review have been explored in the realm of anti-
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discrimination law which, essentially employing proportionality, require the courts to come to 
terms with what are in effect value judgments in factually sensitive proceedings.219 This 
approach is clearly similar to that recognised by Lord Reed in Lumsdon in which the severity 
of review will depend upon the institutional source of the measure in question. 
The key argument in favour of differential scrutiny suggests that the practice may insulate 
judges from value judgments or judicial discretion.220 The related shortcoming of attributing 
differential scrutiny to measures dependent upon the right in issue is the covert creation of a 
priori weighting not present in their originating instruments. This is particularly the case in 
those instances where rights may clash with one another. Moreover, the purported insulation 
provided by variable scrutiny is an illusion that requires the judiciary to adopt their own value 
analysis as to what is the more important legislative source for the rights in issue, in effect 
balancing rights.221 This is concerning in terms of legal certainty as it forces the court to 
balance rights behind a veneer of objectivity in matters which are at their core subjective.222 
In such cases it would therefore be appropriate for the courts to make clear their reasoning by 
adopting full proportionality analysis. This would not require a break from Lumsdon as such 
but would serve to allow the court’s guidance on the jurisprudence of the CJEU to ‘calibrate 
proportionality in the light of prior value determinations’.223 This calibration would take place 
in the fourth test stage of the proportionality analysis recognised in Bank Mellat which also 
features in the jurisprudence of the CJEU as influenced by the European Court of Human 
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Rights.224 It will be recalled that the fourth stage of full proportionality analysis is ‘whether the 
impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefit of the impugned 
measure’.225 In the High Court hearing of Lumsdon this is precisely the test that Sir Brian 
Leveson applied. In reviewing the ‘fair balance’226 of the scheme Sir Brian noted the 
importance of good quality advocacy to the effective operation of the criminal justice system 
which is a benefit to the community as a whole recognising that the pursuit for fair balance 
should not be conducted in a vacuum.227 This realisation allows for the High Court’s finding 
that the measure is not disproportionate and therefore not in breach of EU legislation. This is 
not a different outcome to that of the Supreme Court upon the same facts but rather a 
principled judgment with the benefit of ‘a powerful... predictive tool’’228 thereby providing 
precedential value for future litigation and, in particular, non-judicial parties who are tasked 
with ensuring their actions are proportionate. In light of this it seems apt that the Supreme 
Court reneges from its uncompromising judgment in Akerman and embraces the advantages 
of full proportionality analysis in all cases concerning fundamental rights. 
9. CONCLUSION 
The current inconsistent jurisprudence around the role of proportionality in domestic 
proceedings is highly problematic. The Supreme Court perhaps deserves sympathy for its 
attempts to cast proportionality in guises that it feels are appropriate for the enormous range 
of circumstances in which the proportionality of a measure may be questioned. Pinnock, 
Akerman, and Lumsdon offer a small overview of the factual matrices which the courts 
regularly face. In developing various models for proportionality the Supreme Court has 
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overlooked the fact that much of the doctrinal groundwork for developing a standard 
proportionality exercise is already complete and present in full proportionality analysis. Full 
proportionality analysis may go further than the HRA 1998, the European Court of Human 
Rights and even the CJEU require but that should not take away from the central task of the 
court in such cases; the protection of fundamental rights.229 Furthermore, in developing 
multiple approaches to proportionality the Supreme Court has unwittingly created a situation 
in which the intensity with which an infringement will be tested is dependent upon matters 
outside of a rights-holder’s control, for example the legislative source of a right or the 
institutional character of the guilty party. The shortcomings of differential proportionality 
tests are starker again following the application of full proportionality analysis to existing case 
law. The Supreme Court should adopt full proportionality analysis and thereby grasp the nettle 
created by the current doctrinal confusion. 
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